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Abstract
The study analyzes the role played by technological determinants, using the approach of National
System of Innovation (NSI), in enhancing or hampering Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with different
motivations, namely horizontal and vertical FDI. The empirical analysis is carried out using data rel-
ative to the final destination of sales of US foreign subsidiaries in 42 host countries grouped according
to income criteria. A three step empirical strategy is employed: first, we estimate a benchmark model
finding that technological determinants exert a greater influence in high income countries especially for
vertical FDI. Secondly, applying a dynamic panel data approach we take into account that agglomeration
economies may play a role as well as other FDI determinants. Finally, we are able to further disentangle
the destination of sales according to whether they are directed towards other foreign affiliates or to
unaffiliated persons recognizing that they are affected by different determinants.
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1 Introduction
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) represent one of the most relevant source of foreign knowledge for
both developed and developing countries. This fact has induced policymakers to favour Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI) inflows because of the supposed beneficial impacts they are going to bring into the host
country such as, for example, growth enhancing effects (e.g Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). However,
the analysis of the motivation for which MNEs decide to invest in a specific host country through FDI
is usually disregarded. In particular, scarce attention has been paid to the different types of MNEs that
each country is going to attract and, with a few exceptions, (e.g. Beugelsdijk et al., 2008), no empirical
investigations have been carried out with respect to the impacts that different FDI motivations may have on
host countries. The general approach followed by empirical literature on FDI determinants is that of simply
examining the relationship between FDI at an aggregate level (namely the percentage of FDI inflows on
GDP) and some country level variables that are most of all related to institutions or to the macroeconomic
environment. Some other drawbacks of the literature can be identified: in the first place, it has been
investigated the role played by technological capabilities of countries only with respect to R&D intensive
FDI, leaving aside to link this concept with theoretical studies on FDI motivations. In the second place,case
studies focusing upon single or group of countries have been carried out but mainly diving them according
to regional criteria. For example, Asiedu (2002) and Naude and Krugell(2007) focus on African countries;
in the same way, Bevan and Estrin (2004) put emphasis on the analysis of FDI determinants in transition
countries, while Du et al. (2008) analyze the Chinese case.
The contributions of the paper to the literature are manifold. Firstly, as no studies have been carried out
linking the literature of FDI motivations with technological determinants, we try to fill this gap by making
use, from an empirical point of view of the concept of National System of Innovation (NSI).Up to now, this
concept has been mainly used in theoretical analysis to explain in which way a country is able to generate,
exploit and diffuse innovations (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992), being employed mainly from a descriptive
point of view and avoiding quantification. In particular, we consider that some NSI functions may result
more relevant with respect to the attraction of FDI with different motivations. Secondly, like Driffield and
Love (2007), rather than adopting an ex-post FDI classification we use an ex-ante categorization that allow
us to generate research hypotheses. Indeed, through data on US MNEs subsidiaries over the period 1989-
2001 we are able to disentangle vertical from horizontal FDI as we have informations on the final destination
of sales in 42 host countries. We further employ a FDI disaggregated measure dividing sales to other foreign
affiliate from sales to unaffiliated persons. Thirdly, we adopt a comparative approach grouping countries
according to income levels rather than following regional criteria.
The paper is organized as follows: in the second section we discuss a framework in which we explain
the two different approaches used in the classification of horizontal and vertical FDI motivations; in the
third section we briefly review literature dealing with FDI location factors explaining why the NSI approach
could result relevant in our study. In the fourth section, we present the data and empirical approach while
the fifth section is devoted to illustrate some research hypotheses to be tested in the empirical application.
Section 6 comments on results obtained from estimations while section 7 concludes evidencing limitations
of the study.
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2 A framework to account for FDI motivations
The topic of FDI motivations has been discussed mainly from two theoretical perspectives: the first refers
to international trade literature (IT) while the second is grounded in the international business literature
(IB). With respect to the first, the early theoretical models dealing with horizontal (HFDI) and vertical FDI
(VFDI) are respectively by Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984). In particular, the aim of HFDI is that
of serving the local market by duplicating in foreign plants the same good produced at home. Accordingly,
HFDI are predicted essentially by market size and high trade costs because firms try to avoid trade barriers
by building a new plant in the host country. Instead, the aim of VFDI is that of taking advantage of lower
costs of production of destinations countries by relocating part of the value chain abroad. For this reason,
high trade costs hamper rather than favouring flows of this type of FDI.1
The approach followed by IB literature is grounded in the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1977) according
to which FDI are attracted to those countries where they are able to combine their own firm specific
advantages, the so called Ownership advantages (O) with the Location specific advantages (L) and where
they are able to exploit them through Internalization means (I). By using this framework, Dunning (1993)
proposes a taxonomy in which he singles out four categories that represent different motivations according
to which a MNE chooses a specific foreign country to carry out its investment. The first three categories
are relative to market seeking, resource seeking and efficiency seeking FDI. They are all part of the asset
exploiting FDI category because they exploit in the host country the ownership advantages that MNEs
already own at home. In particular, in the first case the main aim is that of exploiting the local market
demand, while resource seeking FDI involve the relocation of parts of the production chain to the host
country. This type of FDI is often driven by the lower cost of labour in the manufacturing sector as well as
the availability of natural resources such as oil and gas. It is evident that these two motivations partially
overlap with those considered by the IT literature. However, according to Dunning (1993), FDI motivations
can be driven also by the desire to gain efficiency from the common governance of geographically dispersed
activities when economies of scale and scope are present. Bevan and Estrin (2004) find proof for such
kind of FDI in the first wave of EU accession countries as the prospects of EU membership have favoured
the establishment of regional corporate networks. The last category singled out by Dunning is relative
to the asset seeking motivations. Contrary to asset exploiting motivations,the aim is that of acquiring
specific technological competence or qualified human capital not available at home. This motive has gained
attention in recent years due to the development of a new strand of literature around this topic. It starts
from the consideration that MNEs should not be analyzed just from a “vertical” point of view: it means
that not only the headquarters transfer technologies to their affiliates, but they are themselves involved in
an asset seeking process through the connection with other affiliates or through higher involvement inside
the production structure of the host country (Zanfei, 2000). This hypothesis gave origin to two strands of
literature: the first is related to the phenomenon of R&D delocalization while the second is relative to the
so called MNEs “without advantages” (e.g.Fosfuri and Motta,1999). From a theoretical point of view, the
latter underlines how even a laggard firm may engage in FDI by choosing the location on the basis of the
possibility of reaping technology spillover due to the proximity to local firms.2 The former examines the
factors that should induce MNEs to delocalize R&D expenditures. These factors may be grouped under
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three headings: according to Kumar (2001) who analyzes the location of US and Japanese MNEs abroad, a
first motivation is the adaptation of the technological base present in the home country to the needs of local
customers. The second factor that favours R&D delocalization is that of taking advantage of the skilled
labour force available at a lower cost with respect to the home country. It means that due to the abundance
of trained R&D personnel, MNEs may invest in a specific host country in order to reduce their costs. The
last motivation is that of taking advantage of possible positive externalities that may be found in specific
locations of the host country, such as in the case of agglomeration externalities (Kumar, 2001; Hedge and
Hicks, 2008).
A couple of issues deserves some comments: in the first place, unlike the case of FDI motivations,
R&D delocalization literature has already been linked to country determinants while it is not case for other
aspect of MNEs activities inside the host country. Secondly, we recognize that VFDI can be carried out
in developed countries with the aim of exploiting mainly skills rather than low labour costs and natural
resources. For this reason, in the case of high income countries resource seeking FDI could be considered
to represent to a greater extent asset seeking motivations rather than pure asset exploiting motivations.
3 FDI determinants and location factors
The second theoretical framework we need to discuss is the literature relative to FDI determinants. As
suggested in surveys related to this argument (e.g. Blonigen, 2005) some ambiguous findings about this
crucial topic of investigation are emerged. One of the main reasons lies in the fact that even though the
Duninng’s OLI paradigm (1977) furnishes some guidance into the search for location advantages it does not
provide a definite list of possible variables to test; as a further flaw it is quite difficult to understand the
relative importance of different determinants for different types of FDI. This is due to the fact the paradigm
assumes all determinants to affect FDI in an aggregate way.3
Many heterogeneous determinants may be identified even though they can be labeled under three head-
ings: institutional factors, market related factors and technological factors.
3.1 FDI and institutional factors
Many authors have put at the center of their analysis the role played by institutions proxing them
with several variables such as the security of property rights, effectiveness of the legal system, the lack of
corruption, or the easiness to create a company. As Blonigen (2005) argues the quality of institutions is likely
to be relevant especially for developing countries for a series of reasons: a lack of legal protection increases
the possibility of appropriations of firms assets, in this way reducing the possibility of investing abroad. The
study by Wei (2000) points out that FDI are negatively correlated with corruption.4 Jun and Singh (1996)
examining 31 developing countries found that variables measuring political risks were negatively related to
FDI. In the same way, Busse and Hefeker (2007) recognize that the role played by government stability,
the quality of burocracy, corruption, law and order are particularly relevant in a sample of 83 developing
countries. The reason is that poor quality of institutions increases the cost of doing business. However,
we need to point out that even though most studies provide evidence of a positive association between
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institutions and FDI, some authors also find negative or non significant results: for example, Asiedu (2002),
recognizes that political and expropriation risk do not show a significant impact on FDI in Africa.
Inside the broad category of institutions, a specific role is also given to agglomeration economies.Recently,
several studies have acknowledged that the presence of foreign investors may act as a catalyst to attract
further investors (Dunning, 1998). Several reasons could cause such agglomeration effect: firstly, foreign
firms are quite unfamiliar with the host specific context and the presence of other foreign firms may represent
a signal of a locational advantage and of high profitability. In addition, new investors may try to benefit
from positive externalities, such as knowledge spillovers, specialized labour and intermediate inputs, resulting
from locating their activities next to other firms. This aspect has been empirically investigated by Wheeler
and Mody (1992) who analyze US investors’ location decisions finding a positive relationship with them. In
the same way, Head and Ries (2001), point out that industry-level agglomeration economies explain much
of the location choices of Japanese manufacturing FDI in the United States.
3.2 Market related factors
In the second place, FDI inflows are driven by market related variables, usually measured by GDP per
capita or GDP growth. As theory predicts, a rise in the market dimension should be associated with a rise
in FDI inflows. The studies by Brainard (1997) and Markusen and Maskus (2002) confirm this hypothesis.
The market effect captures potential economies of scale in production and the fact that larger market
dimensions can lead to the recovery of the MNEs investments costs rising FDI inflows. Another variable
deemed particularly important for VFDI is the wage differential: it is usually considered to positively
influence FDI inflows. However, ambiguous findings are present even for this variable: for example, Hatzius
(2000), examining British and German FDI to and from OECD countries, finds that higher unit labour costs
may favour intra European FDI. Finally, other market related variables used in the empirical applications
about FDI determinants are those that measure the macroeconomic conditions of the country such as the
inflation rate and trade effects. The former is usually taken as a measure of macroeconomic instability and
it is considered to influence negatively the level of FDI. In the latter case, many strands of literature are
emerged on this issue: they are related to the exchange rate policy or the trade liberalization issues. In
both cases the effect singled out is not always clear, even though the study by Blomstrm and Kokko (1997)
considered that the liberalization variable had different effects according to the motivations for which a
firm invests abroad. In particular, if the underlying motivation is the exploitation of the market of the host
country the effect in relationship with FDI is negative as far as they are tariff jumping (market seeking FDI)5;
instead if the motivation is related to resource seeking hypothesis the effect of greater trade liberalization
may be positive.6
3.3 Technological factors-NSI approach
Even though technological variables are scarcely employed in empirical applications, globalization forces
have led to a reconfiguration of the way MNEs pursue their market seeking or resource seeking objectives.
Despite the fact that a large domestic market remains a powerful magnet for investors, MNEs are searching
for new attributes, such as those related to technological capabilities meaning that a lower value is attached to
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costs. For example, as Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) argue, the importance of human capital has become greater.
It happens because the need for local skills is growing together with complementary factors of production
or business related services such as, for example, the access to local finance. This means that attracting
MNEs mobile asset requires host countries to improve the availability of local skills and of those factors that
may influence the efficiency and strength of the local firms on which MNEs would like to draw as suppliers
and potential customers. Even though the institutional set-up is one of the most studied FDI determinants,
the gap in this type of literature is a lack of consideration of other institutions and organizations that may
be able to strengthen the innovative capacity at the firm and at the country level. The only exception is
made in the analysis of the Intellectual Property Right (IPRs) regime. The strength of IPRs affects not
only the location choices of MNEs but also the quality of technological knowledge they decide to transfer.
The literature relative to this topic is quite mixed but an important result can be put forward: as Lall
(2003) points out, the importance of IPRs for a country in the attraction of FDI is linked to their level
of development because as confirmed by Javorcik (2004), the IPRs regime influences the composition of
FDI. Up to now, technological determinants have been used to study the attractiveness of FDI activities
based on R&D, neglecting the issue of FDI with different motivations. In this paper we will refer to the
concept of National System of Innovation (NSI) to single out what is the role of technological determinants
in attracting FDI. Let us briefly sketch what we mean by NSI: first of all, NSI concept is a variant of a
much larger family of systems of innovation approaches that includes other specifications like, for example,
the Sectorial Innovation System (Breschi and Malerba, 1997) and the Technological System (Carlsson,
1995). However, in this paper, the focus is explicitly on NSI because the aim is that of understanding the
role played by country specific actors that may be crucial for the building of innovative capacities at the
national level. It should be underlined that a lot of different definitions of NSI have been proposed (e.g.
Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1992). Although it is not possible to find out a unique general accepted definition,
they have in common some features: firstly, these definitions are mainly used to define NSI in a developed
context. As a matter of fact, the attention paid to institutions and organizations related more specifically
to the R&D system is high. Secondly, on the basis of the evolutionary and institutional foundations, NSI
literature adopts a systemic approach towards innovative activities. In particular, the innovation process is
not based on a sequential order of steps, but, rather, it is carried out by feedbacks and interactions among
several actors. In this way, the research process which results in innovation is characterized by collaborative
innovative efforts brought about by the science and the business sector.Finally, they are identified some
basic aims (functions) of the NSI that are those relative to production, use and diffusion of innovations and
new technologies. According to this theoretical framework, three points are worth noting: in the first place,
the role played by the institution endowment of a country is of extreme importance in the NSI approach.
Following Edquist (2004), firms do no innovate alone but, rather, they are part of a complex environment
where institutions and organizations shape and guide their innovative efforts. In the second place, the
process of technological change is not considered as exogenous to the system but of endogenous nature.
As a matter of fact, the focus of the analysis is on dynamic instead of steady states. Finally, the analysis
reserves particular attention to the development of the historic process because, as Balzat (2002) argues,
historically grown structures of a system determine the current economic performance.
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4 Dataset and empirical methodology
To test the relevance of technological determinants with respect to FDI motivations we merged data from
different sources: the first type of variables are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) that provides
data relative to sales of US MNEs’ subsidiaries in 42 host countries7, over the period 1989-2001. The division,
presented in Table 1, is done according to income criteria following the World Bank classification (2008).
The first, second and third group, correspond respectively to lower-middle income countries, upper-middle
income countries and high income/OECD countries. We need to point out from the beginning that in this
study we consider both developed and developing countries. For this reason, there are various constraints
due to the availability of data and the statistical sources that may be used in this respect, because it may
happen that some data are not satisfactory with regard to developing countries. To capture the different
FDI motivations (dependent variables) we use two proxies:
• the first is horizontal or market seeking FDI (mseekjt) measured as a share of local sales over total
sales;
• the second is resource seeking or vertical FDI (rseekjt)8, measured as the share of sales back to US
over total sales.
where j represents host country and t year.
As far as independent variables are concerned, we divide them in two groups:
• First we add to the model some usual gravity variables such as: population (Popjt)to take into ac-
count the size of the country, GDP per capita growth (GDPgrowthjt) that accounts for the market
development potential and the inflation rate (Inflationjt) that stands for the macroeconomic insta-
bility of the country. As we are dealing with FDI flows, we add a variable calculated as the ratio of
imports and exports of goods and services over GDP (Openjt), that measures the openness of the
country. In the end we also added the distance from US to the host country (Dist) and a dummy
variable that accounts for the language commonality (Comlang). The first four variables are taken
from World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank while the last two are taken from the
CEPII database (www.cepii.fr).
• The second group of variables we are interested in, are those that account for technological determi-
nants. The way through which we account for technological variables draws from the NSI framework
adopting the view carried out by Lundvall (2007). According to him, one of the most promising way
of dealing with NSI quantification is that of clarifying what are the functions that should characterize
the NSI framework9.All components of this framework need to bring their contribution to achieve the
final goal at the system level. In order to do this, each component has a specific function to pursue.
According to many authors (e.g. Edquist 2004), the term function is mainly related to a specific task
that one (or more than one) component of the system needs to fulfill. The specific functions that are
singled out and that are part of the framework through which the impact of NSI on different FDI
motivations are measured are essentially six:
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– Firstly it is considered the role played by IPR (IPRjt): the function of this variable is that of
providing the suitable innovation policy: this role is usually played by the implementation of a
proper IPR regime. It should favour the propensity to innovate on the part of local firms as well as
the attraction of potential sources of knowledge coming from abroad. This aspect is particularly
relevant with regard to FDI, because the IPR regime may influence the quality of technology
transferred from the headquarters to subsidiaries, and, as a consequence, the possibility of local
firms to grasp some possible spillover effect. The way we measure this variable is through the
Ginarte and Park index (1997)10.
– The second crucial function is the learning function: it means that a country should be able to
provide the necessary resources needed to create new knowledge. In this regard, the role played
by education is crucial: however, due to the fact that many developing countries are present in
the dataset it is used the number of the scientific and technical journal articles (Pubjt), instead
of the usual indicator of enrollment in tertiary education. Moreover, this variable represents
an indicator of output of research activities and it is a way to take into account the role and
effectiveness of the academic institutions.
– The ability of a country to produce new knowledge is at the heart of the NSI framework. This
aspect is particularly relevant in developed countries while in the case of developing countries
most of the technological effort is not formal. For this reason, as a measure of the overall R&D
effort, it is used the number of patent application (Ptappjt) by resident, instead of R&D intensity
in the host country, as time series for this indicators are not available especially in the case of
developing countries.
– Each country needs specific resources to finance its innovative effort: to take into account this de-
terminant, it is used the percentage of domestic credit provided by the banking sector (Creditjt).
– A specific function is deserved to technological infrastructure: the creation of a suitable high-
tech infrastructure allowing firms to be involved both in simple and more complex innovation
activities is relevant both for developed and developing countries. The proxy used to measure
the role played by the high-tech infrastructure is the number of Internet user by 100 people
(Internetjt). We use this indicator instead of telephone main lines, because the aim is that of
measuring especially the role played by high-tech infrastructure as well as the computer literacy
of the population. All these data are taken from the WDI as they are available in time series
from 1989 to 2001.
Some last comments are needed: the first is that due to missing values our dataset is an unbal-
anced panel and secondly, all nominal values are deflated using GDP deflators (base year=2000).In
the end, some of the dependent variables are expressed in log form: in this way we are able to
interpret coefficients in term of elasticities and minimize possible outliers. The exceptions are
given by variables that are qualitative or expressed in percentage: IPR index, internet users
(per 100 people), percentage of domestic credit provided by the banking sector, percentage of
inflation, GDP per capita growth.
8
4.1 Empirical approach
The purpose of the empirical strategy is threefold and it is reflected in the three step strategy adopted:
firstly we simply test what are the most important NSI functions to account for horizontal and vertical FDI.
In the second place, we test whether the role played by agglomeration economies may result relevant to
account for FDI determinants. Finally, we disaggregate further the final destination of sales disentangling
those made to other foreign affiliates and those to unaffiliated persons.
• From an econometric point of view, in the first step, we estimate a benchmark model through the use
of a random effect model. We choose to employ this technique as pooled OLS technique may omit
unobserved country specific effects leading to a likely problem of aggregation bias which would made
inferences wrong. Instead, using fixed or random effects is appropriate as the intercept may vary over
the sample of countries; however, due to the presence of time invariant factors we can only use random
effects. The specification of the benchmark model is as follows:
FDIjt = αi + β1Dist + β2Comlang + β3GDPgrowthjt + β4Inflationjt + β5Popjt + β6Openjt +
β7Pubjt + β8IPRjt + β9Ptappjt + β10Internetjt + β11Creditjt + γt + jt
We also include time dummies,γt,to account for possible business cycle effects.
When dealing with FDI data one of the possible problems encountered is the endogeneity derived
from a reverse causality problem: for example, with regard to technological variables it may happen
that FDI can positively influence all technological variables. 11 In the same way, some of the control
variables may be endogenous as well: high GDP growth rates may signal high investment returns and,
hence, it cause the attraction of further foreign investments; however, at the same time high growth
rates may be increased by FDI. In the same way, higher amount of FDI may stimulate the increase
in the degree of openness of the economy. To tackle this problem, in this first step of the analysis we
lag one period these likely endogenous variables.
• In the second step of the analysis, to test the effect of agglomeration economies, we include lagged
FDI in the specification of the model turning it into a dynamic panel-data model.
Indeed, as Driffield (2002) points outs, as FDI may be persistent in time, we expect that current levels
of FDI in a country can be highly correlated to previous FDI levels.
In this case, by using random or fixed effect models we may produce inconsistent estimations because
of the likely correlation of error terms with the lagged dependent variable. To solve this problem
we follow the approach by Blundell and Bond (1998),who use the system GMM technique. They
acknowledge that, in difference-GMM technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), lagged levels
are often poor instruments for first-differenced variables. 12 We use as instruments for the suspected
endogenous variables, the second lag of those variables: in particular, earlier instruments dated t-2
for the equations in first differences and instruments dated t-1 for the equations in level.13 As we are
able to control for endogeneity not only of the lagged dependent variable but also of the all suspected
independent variables we do not lag them like in the estimations carried out using random effects.
• In the third step of the analysis we propose to further disentangle the dependent variable: in partic-
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ular, as far as HFDI are concerned, we differentiate between sales destined to other foreign affiliates
(“internal sales”) and sales destination towards unaffiliated parties (“external sales”). In the case of
vertical FDI we are able to differentiate between sales towards US parents (“internal sales”) and sales
towards unaffiliated parties (“external sales”). Again, in this case, to account for possible endogeneity
we lag one period the suspected variables.
5 Research Hypotheses
According to the theoretical framework outlined above we can single out some research hypotheses
that will guide our empirical analysis: as it is divided in three steps, we accordingly divide our research
hypotheses into three points. We also link our theoretical hypotheses with the expected signs of coefficient
according to the level of income of countries as this may be a relevant factor in influencing the way the same
determinants behave in countries characterized by different economic structure.
• The role played by market and institutional factors is greater for HFDI rather than for VFDI. In
particular, we expect that distances and common language as well as GDP per capita growth and
population positively affect HFDI, while inflation rate and openness should negatively influence them.
Our expectations about the importance of these determinants with regard to the level of income of
host countries is that they may result in a positive effect for low and middle income countries. Instead,
with respect to VFDI, market determinants could result more relevant the higher is the income of
countries because they are progressively searching for local skills to be matched with skills possessed at
home. With respect to technological determinants, i.e. those related to NSI approach, we expect they
all positively affects VFDI especially in high income countries as they need to rely more on local skills
than HFDI. Among them, the most important variables could be those related to R&D infrastructure
or the efficiency of the education system and the IPR system; instead the role played by high-tech
infrastructure or the level of demand could result less relevant because it is supposed that in high
income countries the level of infrastructure or the level of demand are already at a significant level.
• The role played by agglomeration economies could be equally relevant for HFDI and VFDI. In par-
ticular, the FDI persistence could be more important for high income countries because the greater
“stability” of those countries may further attract higher amount of FDI.
• The role played by technological determinants for “internal” and “external” sales is expected to be
different in the case of VFDI and HFDI. With respect to VFDI we expect to find that technological
determinants are more important for the case of sales directed towards US parent company (“internal
sales”) as they should enhance the level of the productivity of the firm itself; instead in the case of
HFDI, technological determinants should be less important when sales are for other foreign affiliates
(“internal sales”) as internalization advantages are exploited. This stands for the fact that when selling
to other foreign affiliates the aim is that of exploiting a sort of internalization effect according to which
we may notice irrelevance of both market and technological determinants. Instead, when selling to
unaffiliated persons, the external environments is deemed to be more relevant. We also expect that
this effect could be more important for low income countries because, in that case, foreign firms will
10
be more willing to maintain their assets inside their own boundaries while it could be less relevant
for high income countries that are endowed with greater technological capabilities or better market
related factors.
6 Econometric results
In Table 2 we present the results of the estimation of the benchmark model. As in all the other regressions,
in the first three columns we report the result using as dependent variable HFDI while in the last three
columns VFDI; the columns are in progressive order of level of income.14 We first notice that, as expected,
for low income countries the higher is the distance with US and the sharing of a common language the
higher the amount of HFDI. These results confirm those found with respect to studies (e.g. Filippaios et al.,
2003) in which it is found that the cultural distance positively influences US investment decisions. However,
the same variable negatively affects HFDI in middle income countries while it favours them in high income
countries showing, a sort of non linear effect with respect to income. The same non linear effect, is found
for the size of the country (population) that is strongly negatively correlated with HFDI in low income
countries while it is positively correlated in high income countries. A non significant result, even though
the sign of the coefficient is positive, is found for middle income countries. It means that bigger countries
attract higher amount of HFDI only if their level of income is high: this proves the fact that HFDI are
driven mainly by market related factors.
As expected we also found that openness of the country is not significant in the case of low income countries
but, it is strongly and negatively correlated in the case of middle income and high income countries proving
that the less the country is open to international capital flows the higher is the level of HFDI attracted. This
aspect allows us to infer that market seeking FDI are not completely tariff jumping but these barriers are
more relevant in the case of high income countries. On the contrary, we find that GDP per capita growth
is not significant or even negatively correlated with regard to high income countries: it means that the aim
of market seeking FDI is not the growth of the market but rather its size. A final remark about market and
institutional variables regards inflation rate, that, as expected, is strongly and negatively correlated with
HFDI despite the income level of countries.
With respect to our main variables of interest that are technological determinants, they behave in a different
way according to the level of income. In the fist place, we recognize that, contrary to expectations, in the
case of higher income countries they all display negative or non significant results. This result may be
explained by the fact that the higher embeddness requested for market seeking FDI may also entail a higher
degree of likely imitation on the side of the host country. For this reason, if the host country is endowed
with higher imitating capabilities, represented by a strong NSI, it is easier for them to capture likely leakage
of knowledge. Instead, a strong role is played by education and by R&D technological capabilities especially
in low and middle income countries. A negative role is found out with respect to high tech infrastructure
in low income countries confirming that FDI are only searching larger markets rather than technological
quality. It also means that in this case, US investors are less worried about possible imitating effects.
Passing to consider resource seeking FDI, we first analyze how market related variables behave in comparison
with HFDI. We recognize that they show different signs of coefficients when considering low and high income
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countries. In line with general expectations, in low and middle income countries the higher is the distance
and the language commonality the lower is the amount of vertical FDI. However, this is not true in high
income countries: this may prove the fact that the nature of VFDI, and in particular, the aims of US investors
in high income countries, are different from those specific to countries of lower income level meaning that
they are more turned to asset seeking motivations. Contrary to HFDI, we find that the size of the country
is significant and positive both in low and middle income countries while it is not relevant, even though it
appears with a positive coefficient, in the case of high income countries. In the same way, we always find that
the openness of the country is positive and significant; this is in line with expectations as VFDI are more
“trade intensive” than HFDI, being carried out with the purpose of exporting them back to US for further
manufacturing. In line with expectations, both inflation and GDP per capita growth are never significant
in any of the subsample: the reason is that the aim of VFDI is the exploitation of local skills rather that
the local market characteristics. As far as NSI variables are concerned, there is a significant distinction
between low and middle income countries in which they are non significant or negatively correlated with
FDI being especially true with regard to the education variables; instead, in high income economies, we
notice that some technological factors are particularly relevant such as the R&D system and the high-tech
infrastructure. This proves the fact that asset seeking motivations are prevalent in those countries and
that FDI determinants are changing towards being more directed to exploit technological factors and NSI
structure rather than just low cost factors.
In the second step of the analysis, we implement the sys-GMM estimations presented in Table 3. The
p-value of the Sargan test validates the choice of the instruments and a lack of second order correlation is
correctly found. We notice that in all cases the effect tested is that agglomeration economies are present
both for HFDI and VFDI: this effect matters independently of the level of income. This fact confirms what
found by other studies about agglomeration economies (e.g. Barrel and Pain, 1999)). However, we have
to recognize that NSI determinants and other gravity variables lose significance indicating that lagged FDI
variable exerts the predominant effect. Only in the case of VFDI and high income countries the role played
by R&D infrastructure is positive and significant, confirming results obtained in the previous step. This
strong result proves that agglomeration economies are quite crucial determinants irrespective of the level of
income and that FDI persistence is one of the underlying motivations for which a country is chosen instead
of another one.
The analysis is completed in the third step, whose results are displayed in Tables 4 and 5. We provide
evidence of the fact that when splitting the dependent variables between sales made to other foreign affiliates
(so called “internal sales”) and to unaffiliated persons (so called “external sales”), different determinants
are relevant in each case. Indeed, as far as HFDI are considered (Table 4), we find that, in low income
countries, the inflation coefficient is positive and significant: it proves that the higher the rate of inflation
the higher the sales that remain internal to the firm. However, this effect is not relevant when we consider
higher levels of income. With respect to technological variables there is a quite important difference between
internal and external sales. In low income countries all of them are non significant, in contrast with the
case of external sales in which the function of effectiveness of education play an important role. Similar
insignificant results are found in the case of high income countries while for middle income countries, we
recognize that internal sales are positively correlated with R&D infrastructure and high tech infrastructure.
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Furthermore, in middle income countries, we find insignificant results for all technological determinants and
also for market related variables. A reverse effect is also found in the case of high-income countries in which,
similarly as in the case of low income countries, significant effects are played by NSI functions. However,
we have to notice a big difference with respect to low income countries, that is the negative signs of most
of the NSI variables. This is a sort of robustness check of results found in the first step according to which
market seeking FDI are negatively correlated with technological determinants.
Considering the case of VFDI (Table 5), as underlined in research hypotheses, we expect to find that MNEs
are more worried about the external environment they will find as they need to rely on skilled people in order
to export back products of good quality. Indeed, the external environment becomes more and more critical
passing from low income to high income countries. In particular, in the case of high income countries we
find that a different effect is evident for R&D structure and the variable that measures the education system
of the country. If, in the case of low income countries we find that only the R&D structure is important to
explain VFDI, we recognize that in high income countries a great relevance is given also to IPR and to the
high tech infrastructure. We also find that the role played by education structure is strongly and negatively
correlated with VFDI in middle income and high income countries. This stands for the fact that this type
of FDI is sensitive to the conditions of the industrial environment contrary to what find with aggregated
data; in particular, this role is important especially for exports back to US parents (“internal sales”). In
the case of middle income and high income countries and with regard to external sales variables are most
of all not significant proving the fact that when the splitting of the value chain is not for the final purposes
of the MNE as a whole, the effect is that the external environment is not deemed to be crucial.
7 Conclusions
The rising openness of countries has several impacts on their possibility to gain benefits from technological
knowledge that is outside their own boundaries. Different types of technologies may flow across countries
through various means such as trade, FDI and licensing but not all of them are equally able to influence
destination countries in the same way. In this paper we considered the specific role played by FDI, arguing
that they may be characterized by different motivations, namely HFDI and VFDI. In particular the aim was
that of finding out which is the relationship between FDI determinants related, specifically, to technological
characteristics of the country and different FDI motivations. From a theoretical point of view, in order to
define what are the main technological determinants, we make use of the concept of NSI singling out what
are the main functions played inside it and trying to quantify them.
From an empirical point of view, we use a dataset that allows us to disentangle the final destination of sales
of US foreign affiliates in 42 destination countries, over the period 1989-2001. The empirical analysis is
carried out in three steps and, in each of them, interesting results can be singled out. In the first place, we
propose a benchmark model in which we test the importance of different determinant for HFDI and VFDI.
The main empirical finding is that for HFDI market determinants are more relevant than technological
determinants while the reverse is true for VFDI. In particular, they become more relevant in the case of
high income countries. This may be due to the fact, that MNEs when investing in a foreign country are
also interested to preserve their internal technological knowledge and, for this reason, a higher level of
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technological capacity of the recipient country may also be a signal for higher imitating capacities. In the
second step, through the use of the GMM technique we test whether agglomeration economies matters to
attract FDI: we find positive and significant results across all countries both for horizontal and vertical
FDI. It means that when accounting for the persistence of FDI, this effect predominates on all the other
determinants. The third step of the analysis entails the disentanglement of HFDI and VFDI according to
whether sales are directed to other foreign affiliates rather than to unaffiliated parties. We find confirmation
of the fact that when sales are directed to other foreign affiliate the role played by industrial environment
is particularly relevant in the case of HFDI while the opposite is true for VFDI.
Some limitations of the study are worth underlining: in the first place, we decided to focus just on two FDI
motivations in order to make them comparable across the two theoretical frameworks dealing with this topic
(International trade models and International Business approach) but, a more comprehensive view of the
FDI motivations, would entail considering also export platform FDI as well as a more precise definition and
measurement of asset seeking FDI. In the second place, even though we drawn on the NSI framework we are
not able to consider the interactions between the different component of the NSI; the consideration of this
effect could alter the results and it proves to be an avenue for further research. Finally, we considered just
FDI coming from one home country, namely US: this could result quite limiting as inside a host country
FDI with different origins may be present.
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Tab.1 List of countries
1 2 3
Low income Middle Income High Income
China Argentina Austria
Colombia Brazil Belgium
Dominican Republic Chile Denmark
Ecuador Costa Rica Finland
Guatemala Jamaica France
Honduras Malaysia Germany
India Mexico Greece
Indonesia Panama Hong Kong
Peru Turkey Ireland
Philippines Venezuela Italy
Thailand Japan
Korea, Republic of
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
15
Tab.2 Benchmark model
Independent variables mseek mseek mseek rseek rseek rseek
dist -0.00003*** 0.00002*** 0.00003*** -0.00002** -0.00002*** 0.00001***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000)
comlang 0.16713*** 0.28266*** -0.08804*** -0.00691 -0.13294*** 0.04646***
(0.05085) (0.04840) (0.02651) (0.03277) (0.03517) (0.00622)
lnopen (-1) 0.08589 -0.12445* -0.29639*** 0.14434*** 0.15256*** 0.02872***
(0.07491) (0.06525) (0.02457) (0.04968) (0.04741) (0.00583)
lnpop -0.10417*** -0.06457 0.05219*** 0.08506*** 0.13231*** -0.00139
(0.03973) (0.04362) (0.02002) (0.02719) (0.03170) (0.00474)
GDPgrowth(-1) -0.00133 0.00283 -0.01069** -0.00366 -0.00259 0.00102
(0.00406) (0.00435) (0.00437) (0.00254) (0.00316) (0.00105)
inflation -0.00101*** 0.00003 -0.00506 -0.00115 -0.00004 -0.00065
(0.00024) (0.00006) (0.00445) (0.00149) (0.00004) (0.00105)
ipr -0.05031** -0.04978 0.04058 0.00472 0.08033*** 0.00964
(0.02475) (0.03063) (0.02760) (0.01630) (0.02226) (0.00648)
lnpub(-1) 0.13575*** 0.12931** -0.02163 -0.04821** -0.12376*** -0.00889
(0.03474) (0.05471) (0.02439) (0.02300) (0.03975) (0.00574)
lnptapp(-1) -0.01709 -0.02312 -0.02108** 0.01415 0.05119** 0.00382
(0.01826) (0.03502) (0.01015) (0.01217) (0.02544) (0.00240)
credit(-1) 0.00008 -0.00041 -0.00169*** -0.00043 -0.00001 0.00004
(0.00103) (0.00076) (0.00021) (0.00062) (0.00055) (0.00005)
internet(-1) -0.04426* 0.01150 0.00166 0.00667 0.00229 0.00106***
(0.02610) (0.00840) (0.00170) (0.01612) (0.00610) (0.00040)
Observations 53 63 182 53 63 178
R2 0.884 0.796 0.760 0.695 0.799 0.729
Standard errors in parentheses
***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively
A full set of time dummies is included in all regressions
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Tab.3 Benchmark model: sys-GMM estimations
Independent variables mseek mseek mseek rseek rseek rseek
mseek(-1) 0.72132*** 0.42066** 0.90499***
(0.12855) (0.20668) (0.15049)
rseek(-1) 0.47140** 0.73775*** 0.67423***
(0.24006) (0.17891) (0.17686)
lnopen -0.01369 0.03477 0.00782 -0.07392 -0.01094 0.02377
(0.04113) (0.10000) (0.04657) (0.06570) (0.04075) (0.02491)
lnpop -0.04243 -0.20244 0.00703 0.11339 0.09563 -0.01771
(0.04976) (0.13699) (0.02483) (0.07242) (0.08531) (0.01349)
GDPgrowth 0.00271 0.00325 0.00509 -0.00199 -0.00163 0.00287
(0.00368) (0.00695) (0.00460) (0.00495) (0.00357) (0.00244)
inflation -0.00001 0.00006 0.00267 0.00026 -0.00002 0.00231
(0.00001) (0.00005) (0.00349) (0.00153) (0.00002) (0.00167)
ipr -0.03369** -0.11488* -0.01339 0.00780 0.03207 -0.01087
(0.01482) (0.06557) (0.02395) (0.02241) (0.04053) (0.01179)
lnpub 0.01863 0.18822 0.01521 -0.10769 -0.07452 0.00139
(0.04644) (0.14941) (0.02906) (0.06608) (0.08233) (0.01183)
lnptapp 0.01409 0.03049 -0.00042 0.00403 -0.01820 0.01382*
(0.01968) (0.04534) (0.01706) (0.01699) (0.02155) (0.00745)
credit -0.00056 -0.00038 -0.00019 0.00122 0.00021 0.00013
(0.00077) (0.00092) (0.00031) (0.00098) (0.00049) (0.00021)
internet -0.00150 -0.00080 -0.00120 -0.00177 0.00183 -0.00031
(0.01084) (0.00674) (0.00108) (0.00860) (0.00383) (0.00052)
Observations 49 67 191 51 67 182
Sargan p-value 0.200 0.866 0.984 0.104 0.588 0.887
AR1 p-value 0.0145 0.360 0.000 0.00245 0.0815 0.0169
AR2 p-value 0.391 0.450 0.275 0.619 0.993 0.480
Standard errors in parentheses
***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively
A full set of time dummies is included in all regressions
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Tab.4 Dependent variable divided into into internal sales (i) and external sales (e): Market seeking FDI
Independent variables mseeki mseeki mseeki mseeke mseeke mseeke
dist 0.00003*** 0.00002** 0.00002*** -0.00005*** 0.00000 0.00002***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000)
comlang 0.11221 0.03296 0.06093** 0.23472*** 0.13032*** -0.06101**
(0.08095) (0.08104) (0.02679) (0.04915) (0.04145) (0.02543)
lnopen(-1) -0.50181*** -0.26485** -0.12955*** 0.34166*** 0.01553 - 0.18947***
(0.11986) (0.10925) (0.02475) (0.07241) (0.05588) (0.02358)
lnpop -0.05884 0.06457 -0.05181** -0.02358 0.06984* 0.11982***
(0.06245) (0.07304) (0.02020) (0.03841) (0.03736) (0.01920)
GDPgrowth(-1) 0.01167* 0.00484 -0.00157 -0.00550 -0.00040 -0.00792**
(0.00625) (0.00729) (0.00442) (0.00392) (0.00373) (0.00420)
inflation 0.00108*** -0.00001 0.00489 -0.00120*** -0.00000 0.00891**
(0.00037) (0.00009) (0.00449) (0.00023) (0.00005) (0.00427)
ipr -0.02415 0.01861 0.01169 -0.05677** -0.00764 0.02888
(0.03907) (0.05129) (0.02787) (0.02393) (0.02624) (0.02661)
lnpub(-1) -0.03698 0.07482 0.03851 0.09399*** 0.01294 -0.04603**
(0.05271) (0.09160) (0.02468) (0.03358) (0.04685) (0.02351)
lnptapp(-1) -0.03509 -0.22827*** -0.00516 0.00100 0.01694 -0.02724***
(0.02803) (0.05863) (0.01024) (0.01765) (0.02999) (0.00973)
credit(-1) 0.00264 0.00114 0.00010 0.00083 -0.00065 -0.00148***
(0.00165) (0.00127) (0.00021) (0.00100) (0.00065) (0.00020)
internet(-1) -0.02641 0.03332** 0.00248 -0.02462 0.01070 0.00381**
(0.04104) (0.01406) (0.00173) (0.02523) (0.00719) (0.00165)
Observations 52 63 183 53 63 181
R2 0.763 0.515 0.349 0.901 0.719 0.705
Standard errors in parentheses
***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively
A full set of time dummies is included in all regressions
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Tab.5 Dependent variable divided into internal sales (i) and external sales (e): Resource seeking FDI
Independent variables rseeki rseeki rseeki rseeke rseeke rseeke
dist -0.00002 -0.00006*** 0.00002*** -0.00000* -0.00000 0.00000***
(0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
comlang 0.11427 -0.15368** 0.04563** 0.00342 -0.02041* 0.01004***
(0.13883) (0.07313) (0.01896) (0.01507) (0.01221) (0.00366)
lnopen(-1) -0.01822 0.29585*** -0.03861** -0.02316 0.04074** 0.00934***
(0.21128) (0.09859) (0.01777) (0.02099) (0.01647) (0.00343)
lnpop 0.03353 0.18202*** 0.01097 0.02317* -0.00182 -0.00687**
(0.11384) (0.06591) (0.01443) (0.01231) (0.01101) (0.00279)
GDPgrowth(-1) -0.00351 -0.00717 -0.00094 0.00013 -0.00067 -0.00041
(0.01065) (0.00658) (0.00319) (0.00116) (0.00110) (0.00062)
inflation -0.01140* -0.00009 -0.00895*** -0.00210*** 0.00002 0.00113*
(0.00629) (0.00009) (0.00320) (0.00069) (0.00001) (0.00062)
ipr 0.03481 0.17332*** 0.08808*** 0.00302 0.00532 -0.00196
(0.06875) (0.04629) (0.01983) (0.00752) (0.00773) (0.00383)
lnpub(-1) -0.10434 -0.19133** -0.10568*** -0.02783** -0.00434 0.00704**
(0.09914) (0.08266) (0.01756) (0.01101) (0.01381) (0.00340)
lnptapp(-1) 0.08898* 0.18331*** 0.05101*** 0.00748 0.00978 -0.00043
(0.05271) (0.05291) (0.00730) (0.00555) (0.00884) (0.00141)
credit(-1) -0.00111 0.00098 -0.00063*** 0.00023 -0.00023 0.00006**
(0.00263) (0.00114) (0.00015) (0.00029) (0.00019) (0.00003)
internet(-1) -0.00090 0.00020 0.00400*** 0.01182 -0.00019 0.00032
(0.06803) (0.01269) (0.00123) (0.00746) (0.00212) (0.00024)
Observations 52 63 177 50 63 176
R2 0.493 0.805 0.703 0.685 0.557 0.348
Standard errors in parentheses
***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively
A full set of time dummies is included in all regressions
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Notes
1A framework to integrate both HFDI and VFDI is empirically tested by Carr et al.(2001) and it is known
as the “knowledge capital model”.
2On the empirical side, technology seeking behaviour is considered to occur when the R&D intensity of the
host country is greater than the R&D intensity of the home country.
3It is not considered that for example, market seeking FDI are more influenced that resource seeking FDI
by market size.
4However, quite surprisingly, Egger and Winner (2005) find a positive relationship between FDI and cor-
ruption, especially in countries with high level of regulation and administrative burden.
5Instead, if the main motivation is the exploitation of intangible assets, the tariff jumping hypothesis is
considered as positively correlated with vertical FDI rather than with horizontal FDI.
6The effect of the exchange rate was investigated in an early study by Froot and Stein (1991) who found
a negative relationship with FDI inflows. Other dimensions of this variable were taken into consideration
such as the volatility (Goldberg and Kolsad, 1995) or the effects of the real exchange rate.
7For some years (1999,2000 and 2001) Jamaica and Guatemala are not part of the sample.
8From now on market seeking and resource seeking FDI will be used as synonyms respectively for horizontal
and vertical FDI.
9One of the first attempts to specifically deal with the concept of functions inside the NSI framework is
by Liu and White (2001) with regard to the case of China. After having grounded their framework into
the innovation literature they single out five distinct functions: (1) to provide research capacities (basic,
developmental, engineering), (2) to turn ideas into effective implementation (manufacturing); (3) to favour
the relationship users-producers; (4) to bring together complementary knowledge fostering linkages and
(5) to provide an effective education system. Rather than simply describing the role and performance of
particular actors, institutions and policies, this approach focuses on the description of system level charac-
teristics that include issues such as the distribution of these activities within the system, the organizational
boundaries around them, coordination mechanisms or the effectiveness of the system in generating and
diffusing innovations.
10 This index is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 5, where the value of 0 indicates very weak IPR
system and 5 indicates, instead, very strong IPR system. As it is available only every five years we consider
it remains equal for the missing values.
11An exception can be made for IPR as it is less likely that higher amount of FDI cause a rise in IPR regime.
12As distance and common language variables are time-unvarying we do not include them in the specification
of this model.
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13Due to problems related to the fact that the Sargan test may not be reliable when the number of instruments
exceeds the number of regressors, instruments are collapsed and it is limited the use of lags (until the third)
for variables used as instruments (Roodman, 2006).
14We report the results of random effects model, even though by using a Lagrangian Multiplier test we
found that especially with respect to low and middle income countries we cannot reject the hypothesis
of consistence of pooled OLS estimates. We also conducted a VIF test based on a regression with all
countries finding that all coefficients are all below the threshold value of 10 evidencing no problem of
multicollinearity.
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